https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-5/indictment-by-grand-jury
Ezekiel 44.19:And when they go forth into the utter court, even into the utter court to the people, they shall put off their garments wherein they ministered, and lay them in the holy chambers, and they shall put on other garments; and they shall not sanctify the people with their garments. |
INDICTMENT BY GRAND JURY
The history of the grand jury is rooted in the common and civil
law, extending back to Athens, pre-Norman England, and the Assize of
Clarendon promulgated by Henry II.1
The right seems to have been first mentioned in the colonies in the
Charter of Liberties and Privileges of 1683, which was passed by the
first assembly permitted to be elected in the colony of New York.2
Included from the first in Madison’s introduced draft of the Bill of
Rights, the provision elicited no recorded debate and no opposition.
“The grand jury is an English institution, brought to this country by
the early colonists and incorporated in the Constitution by the
Founders. There is every reason to believe that our constitutional grand
jury was intended to operate substantially like its English progenitor.
The basic purpose of the English grand jury was to provide a fair
method for instituting criminal proceedings against persons believed to
have committed crimes. Grand jurors were selected from the body of the
people and their work was not hampered by rigid procedural or evidential
rules. In fact, grand jurors could act on their own knowledge and were
free to make their presentments or indictments on such information as
they deemed satisfactory. Despite its broad power to institute criminal
proceedings the grand jury grew in popular favor with the years. It
acquired an independence in England free from control by the Crown or
judges. Its adoption in our Constitution as the sole method for
preferring charges in serious criminal cases shows the high place it
held as an instrument of justice. And in this country as in England of
old the grand jury has convened as a body of laymen, free from technical
rules, acting in secret, pledged to indict no one because of prejudice
and to free no one because of special favor.”3
The prescribed constitutional function of grand juries in federal courts4
is to return criminal indictments, but the juries serve a considerably
broader series of purposes as well. Principal among these is the
investigative function, which is served through the fact that grand
juries may summon witnesses by process and compel testimony and the
production of evidence generally. Operating in secret, under the
direction but not control of a prosecutor, not bound by many evidentiary
and constitutional restrictions, such juries may examine witnesses in
the absence of their counsel and without informing them of the object of
the investigation or the place of the witnesses in it.5
The exclusionary rule is inapplicable in grand jury proceedings, with
the result that a witness called before a grand jury may be questioned
on the basis of knowledge obtained through the use of illegally seized
evidence.6 In thus allowing the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
the Court nonetheless restated the principle that, although free of
many rules of evidence that bind trial courts, grand juries are not
unrestrained by constitutional consideration.7 A witness called before a grand jury is not entitled to be informed that he may be indicted for the offense under inquiry8
and the commission of perjury by a witness before the grand jury is
punishable, irrespective of the nature of the warning given him when he
appears and regardless of the fact that he may already be a putative
defendant when he is called.9
Of greater significance were two cases in which the Court held the Fourth Amendment
to be inapplicable to grand jury subpoenas requiring named parties to
give voice exemplars and handwriting samples to the grand jury for
identification purposes.10
According to the Court, the issue turned on a dual inquiry—“whether
either the initial compulsion of the person to appear before the grand
jury, or the subsequent directive to make a voice recording is an
unreasonable ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”11
First, a subpoena to appear was held not to be a seizure, because it
entailed significantly less social and personal affront than did an
arrest or an investigative stop, and because every citizen has an
obligation, which may be onerous at times, to appear and give whatever
aid he may to a grand jury.12 Second, the directive to make a voice recording or to produce handwriting samples did not bring the Fourth Amendment into play because no one has any expectation of privacy in the characteristics of either his voice or his handwriting.13 Because the Fourth Amendment
was inapplicable, there was no necessity for the government to make a
preliminary showing of the reasonableness of the grand jury requests.
Besides indictments, grand juries may also issue reports that may
indicate nonindictable misbehavior, mis- or malfeasance of public
officers, or other objectionable conduct.14
Despite the vast power of grand juries, there is little in the way of
judicial or legislative response designed to impose some supervisory
restrictions on them.15
Within the meaning of this article a crime is made “infamous” by the quality of the punishment that may be imposed.16 “What punishments shall be considered as infamous may be affected by the changes of public opinion from one age to another.”17 Imprisonment in a state prison or penitentiary, with or without hard labor,18 or imprisonment at hard labor in the workhouse of the District of Columbia,19
falls within this category. The pivotal question is whether the
offense is one for which the court is authorized to award such
punishment; the sentence actually imposed is immaterial. “When the
accused is in danger of being subjected to an infamous punishment if
convicted, he has the right to insist that he shall not be put upon his
trial, except on the accusation of a grand jury.”20
Thus, an act that authorized imprisonment at hard labor for one year,
as well as deportation, of Chinese aliens found to be unlawfully within
the United States, created an offense that could be tried only upon
indictment.21 Counterfeiting,22 fraudulent alteration of poll books,23 fraudulent voting,24 and embezzlement,25 have been declared to be infamous crimes. It is immaterial how Congress has classified the offense.26
An act punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment
for not more than six months is a misdemeanor, which can be tried
without indictment, even though the punishment exceeds that specified in
the statutory definition of “petty offenses.”27
A person can be tried only upon the indictment as found by the
grand jury, and especially upon its language found in the charging part
of the instrument.28 A change in the indictment that does not narrow its scope deprives the court of the power to try the accused.29
Although additions to offenses alleged in an indictment are
prohibited, the Court has now ruled that it is permissible “to drop from
an indictment those allegations that are unnecessary to an offense that
is clearly contained within it,” as, for example, a lesser included
offense.30
There being no constitutional requirement that an indictment be
presented by a grand jury in a body, an indictment delivered by the
foreman in the absence of other grand jurors is valid.31 If valid on its face, an indictment returned by a legally constituted, non-biased grand jury satisfies the requirement of the Fifth Amendment
and is enough to call for a trial on the merits; it is not open to
challenge on the ground that there was inadequate or incompetent
evidence before the grand jury.32
The protection of indictment by grand jury extends to all persons
except those serving in the armed forces. All persons in the regular
armed forces are subject to court martial rather than grand jury
indictment or trial by jury.33
The exception’s limiting words “when in actual service in time of war
or public danger” apply only to members of the militia, not to members
of the regular armed forces. In 1969, in O’Callahan v. Parker,
the Court held that offenses that are not “service connected” may not be
punished under military law, but instead must be tried in the civil
courts in the jurisdiction where the acts took place.34 In 1987, however, this decision was overruled, with the Court emphasizing the “plain language” of Article I, § 8, clause 14,35 and not directly addressing any possible limitation stemming from the language of the Fifth Amendment.36
“[T]he requirements of the Constitution are not violated where, as
here, a court-martial is convened to try a serviceman who was a member
of the armed services at the time of the offense charged.”37
Even under the service connection rule, it was held that offenses
against the laws of war, whether committed by citizens or by alien enemy
belligerents, could be tried by a military commission.38
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